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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose the United States Supreme Court treated itself to a visit
to the National Gallery of Art. One doubts whether the Justices
would be able to fully appreciate the artwork. In particular, imagine
the members of the Court observing the paintings of Georges Seurat,
the Post-Impressionist who created controversy by inventing “Divisionism,” a method sometimes called “Pointillism.”1 In his paintings,
Seurat meticulously juxtaposed “minute touches of unmixed pigments,”2 relying on the mechanism of sight itself 3 to cause the
viewer’s eye to combine the different colors into a whole “when
viewed at the proper distance.”4 Thus, in placing each individual
speck of paint on the canvas, Seurat intended that his audience

* Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, California State University Fullerton;
former Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California; J.D., Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles, 1987; B.A., University of California Los Angeles, 1983.
1. THAMES AND HUDSON, IMPRESSIONIST AND POST-IMPRESSIONIST MASTERPIECES AT
THE MUSEE D’O RSEY 172 (1986). The National Gallery of Art Web Page, at http://www.
nga.gov/cgi-bin/printo?Object-6111/+0+none [hereinafter The National Gallery of Art].
2. The National Gallery of Art, supra note 1, at 1.
3. See THAMES AND HUDSON, supra note 1, at 172.
4. The National Gallery of Art, supra note 1, at 1.
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would see the bigger picture. 5 Yet, the current Court might foil
Seurat’s best plans. Indeed, it seems that Justice Clarence Thomas
would lead a majority of the Court right up to a Seurat painting,
such as The Lighthouse at Honfleur, with a magnifying glass, and
say, “That one dot is pink!” 6 Apparently, four other Justices, huddled
near the painting, would nod in agreement, missing the overall picture of a landscape of the beach.7
The Supreme Court likewise missed the big picture presented by
the Fourth Amendment8 when it rendered its decision in Florida v.
White.9 Five members of the Court focused almost exclusively on one
speck of constitutional jurisprudence, the automobile exception, thus
missing the larger rule of the Fourth Amendment itself. Justice
Thomas, who delivered the Court’s opinion in White, ruled that once
a vehicle is deemed to be “contraband,” it is vulnerable to immediate
warrantless seizure, for an indefinite period of time, under the automobile exception.10 Thus, White elevated the automobile exception to
such high status that it outranks the Fourth Amendment mainstays
of the timeliness of probable cause and the Warrant Clause11 itself.
Much like Georges Seurat, the Framers created the Fourth
Amendment realizing that each of its intricate parts affected the
whole. Searches and seizures are to be moderated by reasonableness,
police are to be checked by neutral magistrates, and warrants are to
be supported by probable cause. 12 As members of the Court itself
have previously acknowledged, each of these elements weighs in a
delicate balance of government interests against those of the individual. 13 Yet, the Court in White, by focusing on one dot of law, obscured
5. The eye itself naturally makes this synthesis by “mingling [the colors] upon the
retina.” THAMES AND HUDSON, supra note 1, at 172.
6. Justice Thomas authored the majority opinion in Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559
(1999).
7. The other Justices joining the majority opinion in White included Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony M.
Kennedy.
8. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. 526 U.S. 559 (1999).
10. Id. at 564-65.
11. See U.S. CONST. Amend. IV (stating that “no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized”).
12. See id.
13. In three opinions, Justices Lewis F. Powell Jr., Harry A. Blackmun, and Felix
Frankfurter have observed that “[w]hile the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of freedom from unreasonable [searches], the Amendment does not leave the reasonableness of
most [searches] to the judgment of courts or government officers; the Framers of the
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the overall scene. Thus, in repeatedly tugging at one stitch, White
threatened to unravel the entire tapestry of the Fourth Amendment.
This Article begins in Part II with a review of the history of the
warrant preference and the creation and evolution of the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement. Part III presents White, its
factual background, lower court rulings, and the Supreme Court’s decision. Finally, Part IV critically examines White’s analysis and discusses its potential negative impact on Fourth Amendment protections.
II. THE FOURTH A MENDMENT’S WARRANT M ANDATE AND THE
CREATION AND EVOLUTION OF I TS AUTOMOBILE EXCE PTION
A. The Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Preference
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and seizures, but only those deemed “unreasonable.”14 Determining the precise meaning of reasonableness has been an elusive goal,15 for the
Amendment itself is subject to two contrasting interpretations. 16 The
two approaches to “reasonableness” are based on the Fourth
Amendment’s two clauses: the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause. The Reasonableness Clause provides as follows: “The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”17 The Warrant Clause then provides as follows: “No Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.”18
Amendment balanced the interests involved.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351
(1985) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 696 (1983)); see also Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 744-45 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In New Jersey v. T.L.O., Justice Blackmun emphasized the importance of the Framers’ original balancing of interests, cautioning that
only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, make the warrant- and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a
court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.
14. U.S. CONST . amend. IV; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)
(stating that what the “Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreaso nable searches and seizures”).
15. In Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63 (1949), the Court lamented that “[w]hat is a reaso nable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula. The Constitution does not define
what are ‘unreasonable’ searches and, regrettably, in our discipline we have no ready litmus paper test."
16. The Rabinowitz majority provided the view that reasonableness was not subject to
any “fixed formula,” but instead “must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of
each case.” Id. In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter presented the opposing view, arguing
that reasonableness was determined with reference to the Warrant Clause. See id. at 70
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. Id.
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Some Justices of the Supreme Court have interpreted the Reasonableness Clause as standing alone, defining reasonableness without
reference to the requirements specified in the Warrant Clause. 19
However, for most of the twentieth century, and now entering into
the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court has considered the Warrant Clause as predominant, defining what was needed for a government intrusion to be considered reasonable.20 The current Chief
Justice has recognized the consensus of the Court that the warrant
mandate defines reasonableness:
The ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness. In construing this command, there has been general agreement that “except in certain carefully defined classes of
cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.”21

Another member of the current Court, Justice Stevens, has even
termed the warrant preference as “settled law.”22 In doing so, Justice
Stevens quoted the following passage from the seminal case, Coolidge
v. New Hampshire:
“The most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.’ The exceptions are ‘jealously and carefully drawn,’ and there must be ‘a showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative.’ The burden is on those seeking the exemption to show
the need for it.”23

The first automobile exception case, Carroll v. United States,24 proved
Coolidge’s point, for the automobile exception was so named because

19. “As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the
constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness.’” Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995).
20. In Chimel v. California, the Court expressed concern about a reasonableness
standard lacking the guidance of the Warrant Clause:
To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criterion of reason. It is no guide at all either for a jury or for district judges or the police to
say that an ‘unreasonable search’ is forbidden—that the search must be reasonable. What is the test of reason which makes a search reasonable?
395 U.S. 752, 765 (1968) (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
21. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).
22. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 568 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453, 454-55 (1971)).
24. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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it served as an exception to the requirement that a warrant precede a
police search.25
Further, automobile exception jurisprudence not only continued to
acknowledge the warrant preference, but also raised it to a “cardinal
principle.”26 This principle had very pragmatic results. Since a warrantless search was presumed “per se unreasonable . . . subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions,”27 the
burden was on the government to prove any search without a warrant was reasonable. Thus, it behooved police to strictly adhere to the
specified elements of any warrant exception, including the automobile exception.
B. Carroll’s Common Sense Belief That Mobility Created an
Exigency for the Automobile Exception
In its interpretation of the automobile exception’s place in search
and seizure jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has explicitly noted
the importance of construing the Fourth Amendment as it was understood at the time of its adoption. 28 In White itself, Justice Thomas,
who authored the Court’s opinion, intoned that “[i]n deciding
whether a challenged governmental action violates the Amendment,
we have taken care to inquire whether the action was regarded as an
unlawful search and seizure when the Amendment was framed.”29
The White Court then went on to cite Carroll as a proper example
of the Court’s adherence to original intent. 30 Carroll was a bootlegging case in which George Carroll and John Kiro were convicted of
transporting sixty-eight quarts of whiskey and gin in an Oldsmobile
Roadster, in violation of the National Prohibition Act 31.32 After forming probable cause that Carroll’s car contained contraband liquor, 33
but before obtaining a warrant, agents stopped and searched the
roadster, finding the sixty-eight bottles of alcohol “behind the upholstering of the seats.”34 While Carroll contended that the search violated the Fourth Amendment, 35 the Court ultimately ruled that the
search was proper. 36

25. Id.
26. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
27. Id.
28. See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999).
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Ch. 85, § 26, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1933).
32. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 134-35 (1925).
33. See id. at 162.
34. Id. at 135.
35. See id. at 134.
36. See id. at 162.
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White boasted that Carroll’s holding “was rooted in federal law enforcement practice at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”37 Carroll’s faithfulness to the Founders was demonstrated by
that Court’s examination of “laws of the First, Second, and Fourth
Congresses that authorized federal officers to conduct warrantless
searches of ships and to seize concealed goods subject to duties.”38
White’s explicit mandate to honor the Framers’ intent thus invites
anyone interested in understanding the Court’s opinion to return to
Carroll, the case that created the automobile exception in Fourth
Amendment case law by studying the Congresses of the Founders.
An exploration of Carroll will not only aid in assessing White’s holding and its implications, but will also provide a yardstick by which to
measure the Court’s own efforts at effectuating the original aims of
the Fourth Amendment’s creators.
The Carroll Court’s concern with the Framers’ intent permeates
its reasoning. Chief Justice Taft, who authored the Carroll opinion,
closely examined “[t]he first statute passed by Congress to regulate
the collection of duties, the act of July 31, 1789.”39 Carroll surmised
that review of the act of 1789 cast light on the Framers’ view of
Fourth Amendment rights, “[T]his act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the
Constitution . . . .”40
Specifically, the detailed examination of this law enabled Carroll
to determine the scope and underpinnings of the warrant preference.
The Chief Justice noted a distinction between the searches of vehicles of transportation, such as a “ship or vessel,” and such fixed
structures as a “dwelling-house, store, [or] building.”41 The Duties
Act of 1789 enabled collectors to enter and search the vessels upon
mere “reason to suspect,” while it authorized the search of structures
only if the reason to suspect was bolstered by a warrant. 42 Thus, Carroll concluded that the first Congresses made a distinction “as to the
necessity for a search warrant” between items concealed in “a dwelling house or similar place,” and similar objects discovered “in course
of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel where they readily could be put out of reach of a search warrant.”43 Essentially, officials should obtain prior approval by a judge whenever practically
possible, such as in cases involving fixed structures. The warrant

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Florida v. White,526 U.S. 559, 559 (1999).
Id.
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 150.
Id.
Id. at 150-51.
Id. (citing the statute).
Id. at 151.
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mandate would not be required when following it would prove impossible. 44
This point was so important to the creation of the automobile exception that the Court reiterated it only two pages later in its opinion:
We have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes
to show that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or
other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily
may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or
automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.45

Therefore, the automobile exception was a child of necessity and exigency; when possessing probable cause, police were allowed to search
vehicles without a warrant because a warrant requirement would
simply be unworkable. Further, the unworkability was not mere inconvenience, but impossibility. Chief Justice Taft ruled:
In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used, and when properly supported by affidavit and
issued after judicial approval protects the seizing officer against a
suit for damages. In cases where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril
unless he can show the court probable cause.46

Therefore, as White proudly noted, Carroll did adhere to original
intent. Unfortunately for the White Court, Carroll’s obedience to the
Framers pointed it in a direction that differed markedly from White’s
analysis. Carroll’s painstaking review of the actions of the first Congresses caused Chief Justice William Howard Taft to reassert the
warrant’s role in Fourth Amendment litigation and to make only a
narrow exception to the warrant mandate. Further, this exception
was fully supported by common sense recognition of the exigencies
caused by mobile vehicles. Carroll’s simple distinction between fixed
buildings and moving motorcars was so persuasive that it was still
relied upon nearly forty years later. In Preston v. United States, 47 the
Court reiterated Carroll’s exigency requirement:
Common sense dictates, of course, that questions involving
searches of motorcars or other things readily moved cannot be
44.
45.
46.
47.

See id. at 156.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 156.
376 U.S. 364 (1964).

578

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:571

treated as identical to questions arising out of searches of fixed
structures like houses. For this reason, what may be an unreasonable search of a house may be reasonable in the case of a motorcar.48

C. Chambers’ Strained Logic in Equating Seizure and Search
of a Vehicle
In 1970, in Chambers v. Maroney,49 Carroll’s decades-old exigency
requirement was unceremoniously dumped.50 Chambers involved an
armed robbery of a service station of currency and coins by men who
drove away in a blue compact station wagon.51 Within an hour of the
robbery and some two miles from the service station, police spotted a
station wagon answering the description of the suspect vehicle. 52 The
facts in the case supported probable cause to immediately search the
station wagon in the field for evidence of the robbery.53 However, police chose to forgo an immediate search in favor of driving the car to
the station. 54 The stationhouse search of the car revealed guns and
evidence linking the station wagon to the service station robbery.55
The Court in Chambers ultimately upheld the delayed search under
the automobile exception, thus ending any need for exigent circumstances. 56
Chambers’ elimination of the automobile exception’s exigency
prong was not based on adherence to the Framers’ intent but to a
single paragraph of illogic. Faced with a search of a car after it had
been taken into the sole custody of police at the stationhouse,57 the
Chambers Court performed intellectual contortions to uphold the official intrusion. Justice White, writing the majority opinion, first paid
lip service to the Warrant Clause’s predominance by noting that
“[a]rguably, because of the preference for a magistrate’s judgment,
only the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search
warrant is obtained.”58 This was because only the seizure, or “lesser”
intrusion, is permissible until a magistrate authorizes the search, or
“greater” intrusion. 59 Then, without reference to any specifics, the
Chambers Court equated the “lesser” and “greater” intrusions by
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 366-67.
399 U.S. 42 (1970).
Id. at 51-52.
See id. at 44.
See id.
See id. at 52.
See id. at 44.
See id. at 44-45.
See id. at 51-52.
See id. at 44.
Id. at 51.
Id.
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finding “no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a
car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on
the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.”60 Hence, under the automobile exception, the more intrusive
search is to be treated the same, “for constitutional purposes,” as the
less intrusive seizure. 61 Justice White’s likening of more with less enabled the Chambers Court to extend the automobile exception from
searches in the field to those at the station when the car is already
safely within police custody.62
Chambers gained credibility by receiving the respected patina
that comes with being cited as precedent. In 1975, Texas v. White,63 a
per curiam opinion, explicitly reaffirmed Chambers.64 In Texas v.
White, police arrested the defendant for attempting to pass fraudulent checks at a bank’s drive-in window in Amarillo. 65 While one officer drove the defendant to the police station, the other drove his car
to the station house.66 Later, a search of the defendant’s vehicle at
the station recovered four other checks that he had tried to pass at
another bank.67 Despite the lack of any facts pointing to exigency, the
Texas v. White Court found the search reasonable:
In Chambers v. Maroney we held that police officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was
stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house
without first obtaining a warrant. There, as here, “[t]he probablecause factor” that developed at the scene “still obtained at the station house.”68

In still another per curiam opinion, Michigan v. Thomas,69 the
Court again relied upon Chambers to rule that “officers may conduct
a warrantless search of the vehicle, even after it has been impounded
and is in police custody.”70 To remove any doubt about Chambers’ vitality, the Thomas opinion noted that it “firmly reiterated this holding in Texas v. White.”71 Further, the Thomas Court took the extra
step of specifically rejecting various scenarios of exigency as limits on
the Chambers rule. Thomas urged:

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52.
Id.
See id. at 52.
423 U.S. 67 (1975).
Id. at 68.
Id. at 67.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 68 (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)).
458 U.S. 529 (1982).
Id. at 261.
Id.
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It is thus clear that the justification to conduct such a warrantless
search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does
it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in
each particular case that the car would have been driven away, or
that its contents would have been tampered with, during the period required for the police to obtain a warrant.72

Chambers became even more firmly established in the 1984 per
curiam opinion, Florida v. Meyers.73 In Meyers the Court not only reaffirmed Chambers, but also Chambers’ progeny, Thomas.74 Further,
this opinion even contained an air of irritation at any court failing to
grasp the import of Chambers. Indeed, Meyers found fault with the
District Court of Appeal in that case because it “either misunderstood or ignored our prior rulings with respect to the constitutionality of the warrantless search of an impounded automobile.”75 Thus,
three opinions, all of which might have lacked the benefit of full
briefing and argument,76 and none of which divined the Framers’ intent, enabled the Court to establish, as firmly entrenched, a rule that
created a curious break with Carroll’s formulation of the automobile
exception.
The Court did rely on Chambers in one fully briefed case, United
States v. Ross. 77 Yet, the Ross Court only employed Chambers to support the scope of an automobile exception search in terms of place,
and not of time. In Ross, upon probable cause, police searched two
containers found in the defendant’s car, a “’lunch-type’ brown paper
bag,” and a “red leather pouch.”78 The heroin found in the bag and
the currency found in the pouch were later introduced at trial to convict the defendant of possession of heroin with the intent to distribute.79 When the Ross Court analyzed Chambers, it used Chambers’
permissible search under the car’s dashboard as support to allow the
search of the two containers, the bag, and the pouch.80
72. Id.
73. 466 U.S. 380 (1984).
74. See id. at 382.
75. Id.
76. Per curiam opinions do not receive the same treatment accorded traditional opinions. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), Justice Stevens noted this limitation
in a per curiam opinion: “I respectfully dissent from the grant of certiorari and from the
decision on the merits without full argument and briefing.” Id. at 124.
77. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
78. Id. at 801.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 818. Ross opined:
In Chambers v. Maroney the police found weapons and stolen property “concealed in a compartment under the dashboard.” No suggestion was made that
the scope of the search was impermissible. It would be illogical to assume that
the outcome of Chambers . . . would have been different if the police had found
the secreted contraband enclosed within a secondary container and had opened
that container without a warrant. . . . [I]f it was reasonable to open the con-

2001]

FOURTH AMENDMENT

581

Chambers, the case permitting warrantless searches of cars after
they were no longer in danger of being moved, ultimately did receive
its analytical fig leaf. The case which perhaps best explained the
shift in the automobile exception’s logical foundations was California
v. Carney.81 In Carney, police searched the defendant’s motor home
after obtaining probable cause that he was using it as a site to exchange “marihuana for sex.”82 The search recovered marijuana on the
motor home’s table, in the cupboards, and in the refrigerator.83 Chief
Justice Warren Burger, writing for the Carney Court, traced the
automobile exception back to Carroll.84 The Chief Justice noted that
Carroll “recognized that the privacy interests in an automobile are
constitutionally protected; however, it held that the ready mobility of
the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests.”85 Yet, the Court in Carney added a new rationale for the automobile exception:
However, although ready mobility alone was perhaps the original
justification for the vehicle exception, our later cases have made
clear that ready mobility is not the only basis for the exception.
The reasons for the vehicle exception, we have said, are twofold.
“Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to
one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s
home or office.”86

However, perhaps much to Justice Thomas’ consternation, the factors bolstering the second, “lessened expectation of privacy in cars”
rationale bore little connection to anything the Founders might have
imagined. To explain the lessened privacy expectations of motorists,
the Chief Justice offered:
“Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic
inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence,
police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection
stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes
or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety
equipment are not in proper working order.”87

cealed compartment in Chambers, it would have been equally reasonable to
open a paper bag crumpled within it.
Id. (citation omitted).
81. 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
82. Id. at 388.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 390.
85. Id. Chief Justice Burger also noted that “[t]he capacity to be ‘quickly moved’ was
clearly the basis of the holding in Carroll.” Id.
86. Id. at 391 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 392 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)).
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Thus, later opinions attempted to fill in the gaps in logic left by
Chambers’ abrupt shift away from the exigency rationale. The Court
seemed intent on obscuring its drift away from Carroll with repeated
citations of Chambers’ holding and by the reference to “later cases”
creation of a new “lesser expectations of privacy” rationale.88 Such
tactics could not hide the Court’s plain break with the Framers’ intent as manifested in Carroll.
D. Johns’ Unexplained Extension of the Duration of Law
Enforcement’s Right to Search Impounded Vehicles
Perhaps the Court itself was uncomfortable with Chambers’ attempt to explain away the automobile exception’s exigency requirement for, in United States v. Johns,89 the Court chose instead to simply avoid any explanation. In Johns, federal agents in Arizona observed what appeared to be drug smuggling, about fifty miles from
the Mexican border. Agents inferred that small aircraft had landed
on remote airstrips to supply pickup trucks with plastic packages full
of marijuana.90 Instead of searching the trucks at the desert airstrip,
the marijuana packages were taken to a Drug Enforcement Agency
warehouse and searched without a warrant three days later. 91 Upon
certiorari, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the
“delay after the initial seizure made the subsequent warrantless
search unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”92
The Johns majority not only avoided providing a rationale to explain the reasonableness of a delayed search, but it appeared to be
engaged in an exercise of telling the reader what it would not discuss. Although Justice O’Connor, the author of the Court’s opinion in
Johns, acknowledged that the three-day delay of the search of the
impounded trucks was the “central issue” in the case, 93 she repeatedly refused to announce a rule specifically addressing it. Initially,
Johns merely repeated earlier case law that the “justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been
immobilized,”94 and that, with the automobile exception, “there is no
requirement of exigent circumstances to justify such a warrantless
search.”95 However, the Johns Court offered no rationale to support a
delay as long as three days. Instead, Justice O’Connor relied on Ross’
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 391.
469 U.S. 478 (1985).
See id. at 480.
See id. at 481.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 484 (quoting Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982)).
Id. (quoting Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380 (1984)).
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failure to establish “temporal restrictions” to the automobile exception in upholding the delayed search in Johns.96
Yet, Johns also refused to state a rule placing an outer time limit
on automobile exception searches. Justice O’Connor cautioned:
We do not suggest that police officers may indefinitely retain
possession of a vehicle and its contents before they complete a vehicle search. Nor do we foreclose the possibility that the owner of a
vehicle or its contents might attempt to prove that delay in the
completion of a vehicle search was unreasonable because it adversely affected a privacy or possessory interest.97

Thus, in the case extending the automobile exception’s time limits to
a matter of days rather than hours, the only clear declarations dealt
with the decisions the Court refused to make.
The Court would again announce the automobile exception’s lack
of need for exigent circumstances, perhaps fittingly, in two more per
curiam opinions, Pennsylvania v. Labron98 and Maryland v. Dyson.99
Labron actually involved two cases, Labron and Kilgore. In Labron,
police arrested Edwin Labron after watching him engage in a “series
of drug transactions on a street in Philadelphia.”100 After arrest, police searched the trunk of “a car from which the drugs had been produced,” recovering cocaine.101 Kilgore’s facts were almost as simple:
an undercover informant connected Randy Kilgore’s truck to a drug
sale, which resulted in police recovering cocaine from the truck’s
floor. In both Labron and Kilgore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found exigent circumstances to be a necessary automobile exception
element. 102 In Labron, the Court deemed the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s exigency requirement to be “incorrect,” ruling that “[i]f a car
is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the
vehicle without more.”103
In Dyson, a case in which the Court described the facts as “virtually identical” to those in Labron, the Court reached a similar re96. Id. at 485. Justice O’Connor wrote:
Ross, as the Court of Appeals noted, did observe in a footnote that if police may
immediately search a vehicle on the street without a warrant, “a search soon
thereafter at the police station is permitted if the vehicle is impounded.” When
read in context, these remarks plainly do not suggest that searches of containers discovered in the course of a vehicle search are subject to temporal restrictions not applicable to the vehicle search itself.
Id. (citation omitted).
97. Johns, 469 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
98. 518 U.S. 938 (1996).
99. 527 U.S. 465 (1999).
100. Labron, 518 U.S. at 939.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 940.
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sult. 104 Dyson involved a sheriff deputy’s vehicular search based on
an informant’s tip. 105 At 11 a.m. on July 2, 1996, the deputy learned
from a “reliable confidential informant” that Kevin Dyson had driven
to New York to buy drugs and would return in a particular red Toyota with “a large quantity of cocaine.”106 After corroborating the tipster’s information by learning that Dyson was a “known drug dealer”
in the county, the deputy then stopped and searched his car at 1
a.m., on July 3, 1996.107 The Court in Dyson found this search to be
within the automobile exception, despite the fact that the deputy had
several hours in which to obtain a warrant. 108 Indeed, Dyson explicitly stated, “the ‘automobile exception’ has no separate exigency requirement.”109 Thus, in the same term that the Court decided White,
the Court in Dyson destroyed any remnant of Carroll’s exigency requirement.
II. FLORIDA V. WHITE
A. Facts
The facts are short, but not simple. At some time during the
months of July and August 1993,110 police observed Tyvessel Tyvorus
White “using his car to deliver cocaine, and thereby developed probable cause to believe that his car was subject to forfeiture under the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.”111 Presumably, the facts which
104. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999).
105. See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 465.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 466.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Perhaps because of law enforcement’s failure to immediately act upon this information and arrest White, there is no clear record of the dates of police observations of
defendant’s activities. See White v. State, 710 So. 2d 949, 950 n.2 (Fla. 1998). Regarding
the lack of certainty as to the dates, the Florida Supreme Court noted:
The dates of the alleged prior illegal activities were July 26, 1993, and August 4
and 7, 1993. We commend the State’s candor in providing these dates during
oral argument. As both parties noted at oral argument, the record is unclear as
to the actual dates. The State noted that these dates are contained in White’s
motion for post conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.850.
Id. (emphasis added).
111. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 561 (1999). Florida’s Contraband Forfeiture Act
provides, in pertinent part:
Any contraband article, vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, other personal property,
or real property used in violation of any provision of the Florida Contraband
Forfeiture Act, or in, upon, or by means of which any violation of the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act has taken place, may be seized and shall be forfeited.
FLA. STAT. § 932.703(1)(a) (2000). Th e Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to
simply mean that “certain forms of contraband, including motor vehicles used in violation
of the Act’s provisions, may be seized and potentially forfeited.” White, 526 U.S. at 561.
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supported the probable cause for the forfeiture would have also sufficed to support an arrest of White. Therefore, Florida’s police could
have both arrested White and seized his car. However, “[f]or reasons
unexplained,” police chose to do neither. 112
Instead, police allowed months to pass until they arrested White,
at his place of employment, on an unrelated matter. 113 Police officers
had determined just before the arrest that they would seize White’s
car under the state’s forfeiture act. 114 Accordingly, once police had
taken White into custody on the unrelated charges, they secured the
car’s keys and seized it “from the parking lot of White’s employment.”115 The seizure of White’s car was not incident to his arrest or
by warrant. 116 The sole basis for the seizure was because the police
decided that the car was forfeitable under Florida’s forfeiture act. 117
Once the car was seized and moved to the Bay County Joint Narcotics Task Force headquarters, it became subject to a “routine inventory search,” which revealed two pieces of crack cocaine.118 When
White later moved to suppress this cocaine, the trial court reserved
ruling on the issue, letting the evidence go to the jury.119 Then, at a
post-conviction suppression hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion. 120
B. Lower Court Rulings
White appealed to the First District Court of Appeal of Florida,
which affirmed the trial court’s ruling.121 However, its holding was
hardly an endorsement for the notion that the automobile exception
supported the seizure of White’s vehicle. Indeed, the First District
Court treated the automobile exception as, at most, a fallback argument, which it considered in a single paragraph.122
Judge William A. Van Nortwick, who authored the First District
Court opinion, initially focused on whether the seizure properly followed the state statute. 123 When it finally considered the seizure’s
Fourth Amendment implications, the First District Court of Appeal
turned to the federal circuits for guidance, noting that these courts
112. White, 526 U.S. at 567 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
113. See id. at 561. The First District Court of Appeal of Florida carefully noted: “The
charges on which White was arrested are not the subject of the instant appeal.” White v.
State, 680 So. 2d 550, 551 n.2. (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
114. See White v. State , 680 So. 2d at 551.
115. White v. State, 710 So. 2d. 949, 950 (Fla. 1998).
116. See id.
117. See White, 526 U.S. at 562.
118. White, 680 So. 2d. at 551.
119. See id. at 552.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 557.
122. See id. at 554-55.
123. See id. at 552-53.
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were split on the issue. 124 Judge Van Nortwick essentially chose to
fall in with the majority and held that “a warrantless seizure of a
motor vehicle based on probable cause that the vehicle was used in
violation of the Forfeiture Act does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”125
In offering reasoning to support its holding, the court did not rush
to employ the automobile exception. Instead, Judge Van Nortwick
adhered to, as the court’s preferred rationale, an argument stemming
from law enforcement’s right to perform warrantless arrests. The
court found the following reasoning as convincing:
“If federal law enforcement agents, armed with probable cause,
can arrest a drug trafficker without repairing to the magistrate for
a warrant, we see no reason why they should not also be permitted
to seize the vehicle the trafficker has been using to transport his
drugs. Appellants would have us accord the trafficker’s property
interest greater deference than his liberty interest; they seem to
suggest that the injury caused by erroneous detention . . . is som ehow greater in the case of one’s property than it is in the case of
one’s liberty. We are not persuaded.”126

Almost as an afterthought, Judge Van Nortwick mentioned the
“so-called ‘automobile exception.’”127 White v. State noted the two reasons advanced for the automobile exception: 1) vehicle mobility and
2) the lessened privacy expectations with respect to automobiles. 128
Judge Van Nortwick then recognized that “a warrantless search and
seizure of a motor vehicle may pass constitutional scrutiny absent
any exigent circumstances other than the characteristics inherent in
a motor vehicle.”129 He therefore found it logical to use the “same reasons” of mobility and lessened privacy to allow a vehicle seizure “under a forfeiture statute without a prior warrant.”130
In its automobile exception discussion, the First District Court of
Florida took great pains to avoid simply stating that the seizure of
White’s car fell within the automobile exception. Instead, it only intended to use the automobile exception as an analogy. Like cars
seized under the automobile exception, cars seized by the forfeiture
laws are both mobile and have a lessened expectation of privacy.
Thus, like cars subject to the automobile exception, cars subject to
forfeiture statutes can be seized without a warrant.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id. at 553.
Id. at 554.
Id. (quoting U.S. v. Valdes, 876 F.2d 1554, 1559-60 (11th Cir. 1998)).
Id. at 554.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 554-55.
Id. at 555.
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The fact that White v. State was careful not to rely on the automobile exception as precedent, squarely deciding the seizure under the
forfeiture issue, indicates that the District Court determined that it
was not directly relevant. This is further borne out by Judge Van
Nortwick’s reliance on “logic,”131 grounds not nearly as strong as prior
case law.
When, at the Florida Supreme Court, the automobile exception rationale was placed squarely at issue, it did not fare well. 132 The Florida Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Harry Lee Anstead, hearkened back to a view of the automobile exception articulated by Carroll—an indication of concern for the intentions of the
Fourth Amendment’s Framers. Justice Anstead characterized the
automobile exception as “a narrow, situation-dependent exception
which requires much more than the fact that an automobile is the object sought to be seized and searched.”133 To even trigger the “situation” mentioned by the Florida Supreme Court, two factors needed to
exist: 1) “there must be probable cause to believe contraband is in the
vehicle at the time of the search and seizure,” and 2) “there must be
some legitimate concern that the automobile ‘might be removed and
any evidence within it destroyed in the time a warrant could be obtained.’”134
When applying this two-pronged rule, White v. State deemed the
automobile exception to be “inapposite as authority,” for the case’s
facts failed to clear the rule’s first hurdle, probable cause. 135 Justice
Anstead simply noted that “it is conceded that the government had
no probable cause to believe that contraband was present in White’s
car.”136 As for the Florida Supreme Court’s second requirement of
exigent circumstances, Justice Anstead found it “obvious” that such
facts were absent in the case. 137 He opined:
There simply was no concern presented here that an opportunity
to seize evidence would be missed because of the mobility of the

131. Judge Van Nortwick asserted, “Logically, for the same reasons, a motor vehicle
may be seized under a forfeiture statute without a prior warrant.” Id. (emphasis added).
Moreover, the District Court further undermined the importance of its reference to the
automobile exception by certifying the entire issue to the Florida Supreme Court. Id.
132. See White v. State, 710 So. 2d. 949, 951 (Fla. 1998).
133. Id. at 953.
134. Id. Justice Anstead also stated this test as follows:
The automobile exception is predicated upon the existence of exigent circumstances consisting of the known presence of contraband in the automobile at
the time, combined with the likelihood that an opportunity to seize the contraband will be lost if it is not immediately seized because of the mobility of the
automobile.
Id. at 952.
135. Id. at 953.
136. Id. at 953.
137. Id.
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vehicle. Indeed, the entire focus of the seizure here was to seize the
vehicle itself as a prize because of its alleged prior use in illegal activities, rather than to search the vehicle for contraband known to
be therein, and that might be lost if not seized immediately.138

Having disposed of the automobile exception contention, the Court
in White v. State then considered the argument which so persuaded
the District Court of Appeal, that “since a defendant’s person can be
seized without a warrant his property should be no different.”139 Justice Anstead recognized that such reasoning “simply proves too
much.”140 Specifically, he noted:
If we were to follow that reasoning to its logical conclusion we
would, in essence, amend the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution and do away with the requirement of a warrant entirely
for the search and seizure of property. It will always be more intrusive to seize a person than it will be to seize his property. That
is the nature of human values. However, such an approach would
apparently have us do away with the constitutional law of search
and seizure as to property entirely, simply because we have permitted the warrantless arrest of a person.141

Thus, although the First District Court of Appeal of Florida and
the Florida Supreme Court reached opposite conclusions regarding
the lawfulness of the seizure and search of White’s car, the judges
authoring the conflicting opinions could indeed find common
ground—White v. State was not a case which was easily answered by
deeming police action to have fallen within the automobile exception.
Judge Van Nortwick only cautiously analogized his case to the automobile exception precedent, while Justice Anstead refused to even go
that far. The uniform hesitancy to broaden the automobile exception
to fit the facts regarding White’s car would soon be overcome by the
highest court in the land.
C. The Supreme Court’s Extension of the Automobile Exception to
Seizing the Entire Car as “Contraband”
In White, the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, politely chided the reader that, when interpreting the Fourth Amendment, one must take care to “inquire
whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search and seizure
when the Amendment was framed.”142 The White Court then went on
to present an entire opinion without any independent examination of

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 954.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999).
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the Framers’ intent. Instead, it delegated this task to Carroll, the
original automobile exception case in which the Court labored
through the details of legislation of the first Congresses to discern
the Founders’ intent. 143 White’s brief review of Carroll confirmed the
Court’s distinction, in the “necessity for a search warrant,” between
fixed structures and “movable” vessels which “readily could be put
out of reach of a search warrant.”144
After the White Court’s short trip down memory lane, Justice
Thomas considered the Florida Supreme Court’s refusal to expand
the automobile exception to apply to the entire vehicle. White noted
that the state supreme court had observed that “police lacked probable cause to believe that respondent’s car contained contraband.”145
Justice Thomas determined this was beside the point, for police “certainly had probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was contraband under Florida law.”146
Interestingly, White then relied upon an exigency rationale to
support the seizure of the entire car. Justice Thomas averred:
Recognition of the need to seize readily movable contraband before
it is spirited away undoubtedly underlies the early federal laws relied upon in Carroll. . . . This need is equally weighty when the
automobile, as opposed to its contents, is the contraband that the
police seek to secure. 147

This argument seemed strangely incongruous, given the Court’s flat
ruling in the very same term in Dyson that exigency is simply not a
requirement of the automobile exception.148 Thus, the Court trumpeted exigency when it existed as a colorable argument in White, yet
rejected it as an element of the automobile exception in Dyson when
the facts failed to demonstrate any emergency circumstances.
As a fallback argument, White offered that law enforcement deserved “greater latitude” in this seizure of a car, for it occurred in a
“public place.”149 Here, Justice Thomas analogized to the Court’s arrest cases. 150 In particular, the White Court offered as an example

143. Justice Thomas noted:
In Carroll, . . . [o]ur holding was rooted in federal law enforcement practice at
the time of the ado ption of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, we looked to
laws of the First, Second, and Fourth Congresses that authorized federal officers to conduct warrantless searches of ships and to seize concealed goods subject to duties.
Id. at 563-64.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 564-65.
146. Id. at 565.
147. Id. at 565 (citation omitted).
148. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 465 (1999).
149. White, 526 U.S. at 565.
150. See id.
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United States v. Watson,151 which permitted “warrantless arrests in
public places where an officer has probable cause to believe that a
felony has occurred.”152 White then contrasted Watson with its warrant requirement for arrests in the home under Payton v. New
York,153 explaining the distinction as between “a warrantless seizure
in an open area and such a seizure on private premises.”154 The logic
of the arrest cases would thus seem to distinguish between a seizure
of a car in public and a seizure of the same vehicle in a private garage. Since White’s car was out in public, the Court was willing to extend to it Watson’s right of warrantless seizure.
Justice Thomas sought further support for White’s seizure from
duty and tax cases. 155 Accordingly, the Court in White characterized
its facts as “nearly indistinguishable from those in G.M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States,”156 a case permitting a warrantless seizure of
automobiles “in partial satisfaction of income tax assessments.” 157
Thus, much of the support for White’s dramatic expansion of the
automobile exception cannot be traced directly to the original intent
of the Framers or to automobile exception precedent. Instead, the
very Court which exalted the consideration of law at the time of the
framing158 reached out to such varied authorities as arrest of the person and seizures to satisfy debts under the laws of duty and tax.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT’S REASONING IN W HITE
A. White’s Analytical Approach Has Potentially Begun an
Unraveling of the Fourth Amendment Tapestry One Stitch at a Time
The White Court preoccupied itself with one dot on the Fourth
Amendment canvas to the detriment of the individual’s privacy
rights as a whole. If Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” were a
grand tapestry, White would unravel it in its entirety simply by doggedly tugging at a single thread. As will be discussed below, such
narrow reasoning created an unprincipled reliance on labels and undermined the traditional protections of the warrant preference.
However, before studying each of these concerns in turn, White’s
reasoning must be assessed on its own merits. Were Justice Thomas’
arguments compelling on their own terms? The White opinion began
its Fourth Amendment analysis by lauding the Carroll case for ad151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

423 U.S. 411 (1976).
White, 526 U.S. at 565 (discussing the holding of Watson).
445 U.S. 573 (1980).
White, 526 U.S. at 566 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 587).
See id.
453 U.S. 923 (1978).
White, 526 U.S. at 566.
See id. at 563.
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hering to the Framers’ intent. 159 However, White itself failed to learn
the very lesson it touted in Carroll, for instead of pursuing an indepth analysis of what the Founders might have considered a reasonable intrusion on a vehicle, White simply selected its favorite
buzz-phrases from Carroll. Indeed, White’s treatment of Carroll mirrored its approach to the Fourth Amendment itself; Justice Thomas
picked at particular parts of Carroll in isolation rather than
considering the impact of this seminal automobile exception case as a
whole.
A closer examination of Carroll calls into question several of Justice Thomas’ conclusions in White. Chief Justice William H. Taft, the
author of the majority opinion in Carroll, carved out a narrow exception to the warrant requirement only after an extremely cautious and
methodical analysis. The Chief Justice took the trouble to provide a
detailed review of the legislative history of the federal statute at issue160 and to study the enactments of the First, Second, and Fourth
Congresses. 161 As Justice Thomas noted, Carroll’s meticulous approach did lead it to make a distinction in the “necessity for a search
warrant between goods . . . concealed in a dwelling house” and those
“in the course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel.”162
Yet, in a manner all too consistent with the Court’s myopic focus,
the White Court ran with this conclusion without placing it within
Carroll’s bigger picture. White’s rush to pick pieces of Carroll to support its narrow view caused the Court to miss the more fundamental
point that the automobile exception was firmly founded upon the
warrant requirement. In Carroll, Chief Justice Taft reaffirmed the
Court’s warrant preference as a mandate: “In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used.”163 Further, to forgo a warrant, police had an extreme burden to establish
probable cause: “In cases where seizure is impossible except without
warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he
can show the court probable cause.”164 Thus, unless circumstances
made it impossible to obtain one, officers had to get a warrant.
Thus, as noted in Part II, the Court created the automobile exception out of the necessity that comes from using common sense. Police
could skip a warrant to search an automobile in which they had
probable cause to believe that it contained contraband. Otherwise,
such searches could never be accomplished before the moving vehicle
159. See id. at 564-65.
160. Further, Carroll’s analysis of the National Prohibition Act included extensive quotation of the actual language provided in the law. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 143-47 (1925).
161. See id. at 150-51.
162. Id. at 151; see also White, 526 U.S. at 556.
163. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added).
164. Id.
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escaped the jurisdiction. 165 Due to the exigency of inherent mobility,
the automobile exception was born.
The White Court seemed to experience difficulty fitting the automobile exception’s exigency element into the bigger picture. Justice
Thomas noted that “[r]ecognition of the need to seize readily movable
contraband before it is spirited away undoubtedly underlies the early
federal laws relied upon in Carroll.”166 Justice Thomas therefore
chose to rely upon exigency in White. He offered the following reasoning: “This need is equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed
to its contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure.” 167
White’s logic here deteriorated into a strained syllogism: 1) All cars
are moveable and so must be searched immediately without warrant;
2) in this case, we have a car; 3) and therefore, with the existence of
this car, we have an exigency and can search without a warrant.
In offering such a rationale, the White Court failed to perceive a
myriad of problems presented in the bigger picture. First, Justice
Thomas’ “car creates exigency” contention simply did not square with
the facts in the case. If the police in White were so concerned with
time that they failed to get a warrant, why did they initially fail to
seize Mr. White’s car for several months?168 When confronted with
this gap in logic, the White Court was curiously unfazed. In fact, Justice Thomas could not be bothered with considering the issue of official delay.169 He noted:
At oral argument, respondent contended that the delay between
the time that the police developed probable cause to seize the vehicle and when the seizure actually occurred undercuts the argument that the warrantless seizure was necessary to prevent respondent from removing the car out of the jurisdiction. We express
no opinion about whether excessive delay prior to a seizure could
render probable cause stale, and the seizure therefore unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.170

The Court here treated official delay as affecting a collateral issue
of the “staleness” of probable cause—whether a delay in action would
undermine a police conclusion that the car was still subject to seizure
under the forfeiture statute. This judicial tangent away from the central issue of exigency, obtaining evidence before the car is allowed to
leave the jurisdiction, to the secondary concern of the life span of
probable cause, is curious. Since the Court itself has based the propriety of the seizure not on whether the vehicle contained contra165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See id. at 153.
White, 526 U.S. at 565.
Id.
See id. at 561.
See id. at 565 n.4.
Id.
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band, but whether the car itself was seizeable contraband, staleness
ceased to exist as a practical issue. After all, the police seized White’s
car, not because they believed that it contained contraband, but because they believed that the car itself had become contraband, a
status that would not change with the passage of time.171
Perhaps, in its footnoted retort to the respondent, White considered the nonissue of probable cause in part to obscure the real weakness exposed by its “car creates exigency” rationale. The most glaring
flaw in Justice Thomas’ exigency contention is the simple lack of urgency. Justice Stevens recognized this in his dissent when he argued,
“an exigent circumstance rationale is not available when the seizure
is based upon a belief that the automobile may have been used at
some time in the past to assist in illegal activity and the owner is already in custody.”172 The Florida Supreme Court, upon which Justice
Stevens relied, was even more explicit:
There simply was no concern presented here that an opportunity
to seize evidence would be missed because of the mobility of the
vehicle. Indeed, the entire focus of the seizure here was to seize the
vehicle itself as a prize because of its alleged prior use in illegal activities, rather than to search the vehicle for contraband known to
be therein, and that might be lost if not seized immediately.173

Further, as previously noted in Part III, White’s “car creates exigency” logic not only runs afoul of the case’s facts, but of the Court’s
own law. In the same term that the Court decided White, it handed
down Dyson, a case in which the Court held that the finding of probable cause “alone satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.”174 Thus, Justice Thomas’ emphasis on exigency not only did not match the reality of the individual case, but it failed to consider the larger picture of Fourth
Amendment case law that the Court itself had painted.
171. The First District Court of Appeal of Florida pinpointed the testimony which supported the seizure in this case. Judge Van Nortwick noted:
Here, the police had probable cause to believe White’s vehicle had been used to
facilitate the sale of cocaine, as indicated by the following trial testimony:
THE COURT: Do you know what basis existed at the time you made the arrest
and searched the car to file a forfeiture proceeding, what information did you
have that that vehicle had been used in illegal activity?
OFFICER SQUIRE: These were all Doug Pierce’s cases, it’s my understanding
this vehicle had been used to deliver and sell cocaine on at least two occasions,
maybe three.
PROSECUTOR: And you had been present at at least one of those sales?
OFFICER SQUIRE: Yes.
THE COURT: A sale from the car?
OFFICER SQUIRE: Yes.
White v. State, 680 So. 2d 550, 552-53 & n. 3. (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
172. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 570 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. White v. State, 710 So. 2d 949, 954 (Fla. 1998).
174. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999).
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The Court’s “car creates exigency” blunder was not an isolated
event. White’s careless generalizations from random particulars burdened the entire opinion. To bolster the seizure of White’s car from
the parking lot, Justice Thomas noted that “our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has consistently accorded law enforcement officials
greater latitude in exercising their duties in public places.”175 He then
mentioned the distinction in the warrant requirement made between
arrests in public and those in the home. 176 However, close examination of the precedent upon which Justice Thomas relied, United
States v. Watson177 and Payton v. New York,178 hardly support an ex pansion of warrantless public arrest to warrantless seizures of vehicles on the street.
Watson, the case upholding law enforcement’s right to public arrest without warrant, 179 hardly reached its conclusion in a manner
consistent with White. Instead, Justice Byron White, authoring the
Watson opinion, took great care to consider the law of arrest in the
larger picture of history, state adjudication, and legal theory.180 He
recognized that, for decades, the Court had construed the Fourth
Amendment with an eye to ancient authority originating in England.181 Watson concluded:
The cases construing the Fourth Amendment thus reflect the
ancient common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in
his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if
there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.182

Unlike the White Court, the Watson Court backed up words extolling the virtue of adhering to the Framers’ original intent with deeds.
The Court in Watson emphasized:
[I]t is important for present purposes to note that in 1792 Congress invested United States marshals and their deputies with
“the same powers in executing the laws of the United States, as
sheriffs and their deputies in the several states have by law, in
executing the laws of their respective states.” The Second Congress
thus saw no inconsistency between the Fourth Amendment and
legislation giving United States marshals the same power as local
peace officers to arrest for a felony without a warrant.183

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

White, 526 U.S. at 565.
See id.
423 U.S. 411 (1976).
445 U.S. 573 (1980).
See Watson, 423 U.S. at 424.
See id. at 418-23.
See id. at 417-18.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 420 (citation omitted).
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In its similar review of state law, the Watson Court quoted a midnineteenth century case from Massachusetts, Rohan v. Sawin: “The
authority of a constable, to arrest without warrant, in cases of felony,
is most fully established by the elementary books, and adjudicated
cases.”184 Since it was in the “elementary books,” warrantless arrest
could hardly be considered a novel legal rule. This was shown by
Watson’s recognition that authority to arrest without warrant “has
also been the prevailing rule under state constitutions and statutes.” 185
Watson was still not content by its demonstration that warrantless public arrest was firmly embedded in common law, the
Founders’ minds, and state rules. It continued its analysis by considering the work of the American Law Institute, which “undertook the
task of formulating a model statute governing police powers and
practice in criminal law enforcement and related aspects of pretrial
procedure.”186 Here, even the American Law Institute, the law reformers who draft the model codes, chose to adhere to “the traditional and almost universal standard for arrest without a warrant.”187
Watson’s in-depth approach to arrest law not only shamed White
for the manner in which it addressed the issue of warrantless seizure
of vehicles, but, when read in connection with Payton, belied Justice
Thomas’ inference that the Court allowed warrantless action merely
because it occurred in public. A closer look at Payton reveals that
White oversimplified its rule in order to rely upon Payton as support.
Justice Stevens, who authored Payton, placed arrests in the larger
context of government intrusion.188 He deemed it “well settled” that
when police officers see “objects such as weapons or contraband
found in a public place” they may seize such items without a warrant, for “[t]he seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion
of privacy and is presumptively reasonable.”189 However, the Payton
Court considered it a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law”
that warrantless searches within a home were “presumptively unreasonable.”190 This was due to the increased interest in privacy that
exists inside one’s home.191 The homeowner’s privacy rights were so
powerful that they extended to the search of persons in their homes.
Justice Stevens found the following reasoning persuasive:
184.
185.
186.
187.
1975)).
188.
189.
190.
191.

Watson, 423 U.S. at 419 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 422.
Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 120.1 commentary at 289 (Proposed draft
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-90 (1980).
Id. at 586-87.
Id. at 586 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971)).
See id. at 587-88.
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[C]onstitutional protection afforded to the individual’s interest in
the privacy of his own home is equally applicable to a warrantless
entry for the purpose of arresting a resident of the house; for it is
inherent in such an entry that a search for the suspect may be required before he can be apprehended. 192

Thus, Payton made the distinction between arrests in public and
those in a home based on the crucial criterion of privacy. The Payton
Court was sufficiently sophisticated to understand that a seizure
might not be an isolated event, but instead part of a larger intrusion
that included a search. Rather than treating the arrest of a person
and the search of that person as separate and independent events,
Payton realized that, in an arrest at a home, the seizure and search
intrusions were intertwined. Therefore, the Watson/Payton precedent
did not simply apply the warrant requirement based upon whether or
not police had a roof over their heads. These cases, when read together, limit seizures in the home because of the potential invasion
they could have on the right of privacy. When the complete portrait
painted by Watson and Payton is thus fully viewed, these cases actually point to a conclusion opposite that reached in White. Instead of
allowing warrantless seizures of cars merely because these vehicles
can be seen on a public street, Watson and Payton would restrict
such actions if they would ultimately result in warrantless searches
of the vehicles’ interiors.
The Divisionist painter Seurat understood that his artwork relied
upon the viewer to consider the whole. In the most basic sense, he
expected that those looking at his entire painting would allow their
eyes to naturally combine a red dot with an yellow one in order to see
orange. The Payton Court was likewise alert to the whole; it mandated a warrant for an arrest in a home because prior judicial approval was necessary to protect the privacy invaded in executing an
arrest in a house.
To its credit, the White Court seemed to make an attempt, however clumsily, to connect the seizure power with its resulting privacy
invasion. Justice Thomas explicitly noted the distinction between a
seizure “in an open area and such a seizure on private premises.” 193
However, White went on to conclude “seizures of automobiles . . . on
public streets, parking lots, or other open places, [does] not involve
any invasion of privacy.”194 White’s consideration of the interplay of
seizure and privacy caused it to look directly at a red dot and a yellow dot and still miss the resulting blend into orange. Justice Thomas failed to see a privacy problem because he focused only on the
192. Id. at 588.
193. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 566 (1999) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 587 (1980)).
194. Id. (quoting G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 351 (1997)).
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police seizure of White’s vehicle in “a public area—respondent’s employer’s parking lot.”195 The seizure of White’s car and the invasion of
his privacy were indeed intertwined, but not because of the place
where the car was located. Instead, the privacy invasion occurred
during the later, and common, inventory search under South Dakota
v. Opperman. 196 Justice Thomas himself recognized as much when he
noted that the seizure in White led to a “subsequent inventory
search.”197 Justice Stevens was even more explicit:
And a seizure supported only by the officer’s conclusion that at
some time in the past there was probable cause to believe that the
car was then being used illegally is especially intrusive when followed by a routine and predictable inventory search—even though
there may be no basis for believing the car then contains any contraband or other evidence of wrongdoing.198

Thus, the White Court identified as the relevant privacy invasion
the police intrusion upon the location where the vehicle was parked,
rather than the inventory search which routinely occurred with the
impounding of a seized vehicle. White’s attention seems curiously
misdirected. The search for a car in a typical garage would rarely be
highly intrusive; where would an individual “hide” the car in the garage? In contrast to this relatively minimal intrusion, an inventory
search of the interior of the vehicle itself can be quite probing, for
people have been known to store all sorts of personal items in the
compartments and containers of cars. In focusing on the stray speck
of information regarding the vehicle’s location, the Court blinded itself to the larger invasion of the inventory search.
The White opinion therefore is not a model of internal consistency.
Justice Thomas demanded inquiry into the Framers’ intent and then
failed to independently perform such an assessment. 199 The Court in
White promoted an exigency argument that was unsupported by the
case’s facts and inconsistent with case law the Court itself had
handed down in the very same term. 200 Furthermore, it relied on selected passages of arrest precedent that failed to provide an analytical foundation for warrantless seizures of vehicles. 201 This piecemeal
approach thus enabled the Court to expand the automobile exception
at the cost of the bigger picture of Fourth Amendment fundamentals.

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
428 U.S. 364 (1976).
White, 526 U.S. at 562.
Id. at 571-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 563.
See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999).
See White, 526 U.S. at 565-66.
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B. The Court in White Promoted Label Logic
White not only honed-in on bits of search and seizure law at the
cost of the overall picture of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it
magnified the significance of various rules by stamping them with
labels. The resulting label-logic wound up arguing too much. As
much was alluded to even by the justices who concurred with the majority opinion. 202 Justice Souter wrote separately in order to explicitly
voice his reservation:
I join the Court’s opinion subject to a qualification against reading
our holding as a general endorsement of warrantless seizures of
anything a State chooses to call “contraband,” whether or not the
property happens to be in public when seized. The Fourth
Amendment does not concede any talismanic significance to use of
the term “contraband” whenever a legislature may resort to a
novel forfeiture sanction in the interest of law enforcement, as legislatures are evincing increasing ingenuity in doing.203

Justice Souter’s assertion to the contrary cannot conceal the obvious danger in the White Court’s reasoning. The Court has resorted to
label-logic, where a notion’s name has more importance than its origins in precedent or its implications for Fourth Amendment rights.
In fact, Justice Souter may have stumbled upon the perfect metaphor
in speaking of a talisman; to the majority in White, the legal category
of “contraband” became a talisman—a thing “producing apparently
magical or miraculous effects.”204
Now, when a state legislature speaks the sacred word “contraband,” the White Court would have all Fourth Amendment restrictions magically disappear. The incantation of “contraband” caused
this very result in White, where the Florida legislature defined “contraband” to include any “vehicle of any kind, . . . which was used . . .
as an instrumentality in the commission of, or in aiding or abetting
in the commission of, any felony.”205 The Court in White then used
this legislative label to extend the automobile exception to include
“the vehicle itself.”206 Thus, the critical fact that “there must be probable cause to believe contraband is in the vehicle at the time of the
search and seizure,”207 an element crafted by Carroll, simply disappeared.
The “car as contraband” formulation dramatically extended the
potential reach of the government’s seizure powers. Traditionally,
contraband has been understood to be objects so evil that their mere
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See id. at 566-67 (Souter, J., concurring & Breyer, J., joining).
Id.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1202 (10th ed. 1993).
White, 526 U.S. at 565 n.3 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 932.701(2)(a)(5) (2000)).
Id. at 565.
White v. State, 710 So. 2d 949, 953 (Fla. 1998) (emphasis added).
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production or possession constitutes criminality.208 Thus, the very
dangerous nature of the property itself, whether it be counterfeit
money, controlled substances, or illegal weapons, offered a common
sense rationale for official seizure. These items were therefore unlawful to possess “regardless of purpose.”209 Automobiles hardly fit
within a category of such a nefarious nature, for “’[t]here is nothing
even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile.’”210
Expanding “contraband” to include neutral items could have unfortunate collateral consequences in daily practice. In his dissent,
Justice Stevens recognized the potential unfairness in the “state’s
treatment of certain vehicles as ‘contraband’ based on past use.”211 He
noted, “Unlike a search that is contemporaneous with an officer’s
probable-cause determination, a belated seizure may involve a serious intrusion on the rights of innocent persons with no connection to
the earlier offense.”212 Justice Stevens cited Bennis v. Michigan213 as
support. 214 In Bennis, Tina Bennis lost her family car, which she herself had paid for, when her husband was caught performing a lewd
act with a prostitute in the vehicle. 215 The Supreme Court upheld
Michigan’s forfeiture of the car despite Tina Bennis’ uncontested innocence.216 In White, the Court’s unrestricted use of the “contraband”
label risks similar troubles for those who lose vehicles in the Fourth
Amendment context.
C. White Undermined the Warrant Preference
The Court which crafted the majority opinion in Carroll would
hardly recognize either the current version of the warrant preference
or its automobile exception to it. As noted in Part II.B., the Carroll
Court strictly adhered to the mandates of the Warrant Clause, crafting the automobile exception only after in-depth analysis convinced it
that such a rule would not run counter to the Framers’ original intent. 217 Further, decades of litigation served to reinforce Carroll’s
deference to the Warrant Clause. Nearly a half-century after Carroll,
the Court accepted as its “most basic constitutional rule” in Fourth
208. Contraband is defined as, “in general, any property which is unlawful to produce
or possess.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (6th ed. 1990).
209. White, 526 U.S. at 571 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. Id. (quoting Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 (1993)).
211. Id. at 571 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. Id.
213. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
214. See White, 526 U.S. at 571 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. See Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 486
(Mich. 1994).
216. For a detailed discussion of Bennis v. Michigan, see George M. Dery III, Adding
Injury to Insult: The Supreme Court’s Extension of Civil Forfeiture to Its Illogical Extreme
in Bennis v. Michigan, 48 S.C. L. REV . 359 (1997).
217. See supra Part II.B.
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Amendment law that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.”218
The warrant presumption has been so revered in the Court’s
precedent that the White Court itself was leery to overtly reject it.
However, as Justice Stevens noted, although White dared “not expressly disavow the warrant presumption,” its ruling “suggest[ed]
that the exceptions have all but swallowed the general rule.”219 This
was due to the fact that the White Court’s deeds spoke louder than
its words. The White Court branded the case before it as one within
the automobile exception despite the dearth of probable cause to believe the car contained any contraband220 and notwithstanding the
police’s total lack of concern in the exigency of losing the vehicle from
its jurisdiction.221 White’s invocation of the automobile exception was
particularly brash; even the First District Court of Appeal of Florida,
which ruled in the government’s favor, only ventured to say it was
“influenced” by the fact that the evidence was found in a vehicle.222
Extending the automobile exception to include seizure of the vehicle itself was especially unfortunate in White, for the circu mstances
of the case revealed exceptionally lax policing. For reasons known
only to the officers involved, police failed to either arrest White or
search his vehicle when they first learned of his drug sales from his
car.223 Instead they waited over two months before arresting White
on an entirely unrelated offense.224 At least, it is assumed it was
some two months; due to its own carelessness, the government had to
estimate this time by relying on information supplied by the defendant. 225 Such uncertainty about the timing hardly points to exigency—rather, it appears that gaining access to White’s vehicle under the automobile exception was not a law enforcement priority.

218. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 442, 454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz v. U.S.,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
219. White, 526 U.S. at 569 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. The Florida Supreme Court reasoned: “Since it is conceded that the government
had no probable cause to believe that contraband was present in White’s car, we conclude
that Carney and the automobile exception are inapposite as authority.” White v. State, 710
So. 2d 949, 953 (Fla. 1998).
221. Justice Stevens dryly noted as follows: “For reasons unexplained, the police neither arrested White [when originally suspected of selling narcotics from his vehicle] nor
seized his automobile as an instrumentality of his alleged narcotics offenses.” White, 526
U.S. at 567 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. White v. State, 680 So. 2d 550, 554 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
223. See White, 526 U.S. at 567 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. See id.; White v. State, 710 So. 2d at 950.
225. Justice Anstead of the Florida Supreme Court wrote, “the State noted that [the
relevant] dates are contained in White’s motion for post-conviction relief.” White v. State,
710 So. 2d at 950 n.2.
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It is hard to picture a case where police would have more leisure
to obtain a warrant. The officers searching White’s car would be
hard-pressed to offer details supporting any exigency preventing
prior judicial approval. What is most striking however, is that the
Florida officials did not even bother. As Justice Stevens noted, “the
particularly troubling aspect of this case is not that the State provides a weak excuse for failing to obtain a warrant either before or
after White’s arrest, but that it offers us no reason at all.”226 The facts
demonstrate the drift the Court has suffered since its original formation of the automobile exception. Carroll has been so eroded that the
concept of impossibility has been turned on its head. Once, police
could act without a warrant only when the seizure with warrant
would be impossible. 227 Now, in White, the only impossibility presented involves the official explanation of delay—police cannot explain months of inaction, so they do not even bother making the attempt. Therefore, when the Court in White chose to sanction this behavior with an extension of the automobile exception, it destroyed
the practical impact of the traditional warrant preference.
Marginalizing the warrant requirement for government seizure of
contraband is perilous, for the Court itself has recognized that the
lure of gain may cloud official judgment. In a case apparently so clear
that it did not require full briefing, the Court in Connally v. Georgia228 expressed concern about the impact a monetary interest in a
matter could have on government decisionmaking.229 In Connally, the
Court reviewed a Georgia statute that provided a five dollar fee to
the justice of the peace for every search warrant he or she issued. 230
The same justice of the peace, however, collected no fee for “reviewing and denying” a search warrant application.231 The choice whether
to grant or deny a warrant affected the “financial welfare” of the justice of the peace.232 The situation therefore offered “a possible temptation to the average man as a judge . . . or which might lead him not
to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused.”233 Since Georgia’s payment scheme undermined the neutrality of the magistrate, Connally held that “the issuance of the search
warrant . . . effected a violation of the protections afforded [the de-

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
1968)).

White, 526 U.S. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
429 U.S. 245 (1977) (per curiam).
Id. at 246-49.
See id. at 246.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 250.
Id. at 250 (quoting Bennett v. Cottingham, 290 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (N.D. Ala.
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fendant] by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution.”234
If Connally felt compelled to strike down a statute based on the
corrupting effects of five dollars, it is curious that White failed to recognize the dangers inherent from seizing an entire car, potentially
worth thousands of dollars. The amount of money at stake in White
was not unique. The high finances involved in seizure matters is belied by the cases’ very names: United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency,235 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,236 and One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States.237 Thus, White’s
logic would seem to indicate that five dollars could cause a member of
the judiciary to compromise his principals, but cash, yachts, and precious gems would have no such effect on police.238
Finally, in ignoring the temptations that the powers of forfeiture
offer to officials unrestricted by warrants, the Court made its most
fundamental failure to consider the Framers’ intentions. The United
States Constitution’s very structure is based on the Founders’ realization that officials cannot be trusted to avoid the temptations pro-

234. Id. at 251.
235. 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995).
236. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
237. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
238. Such a conclusion regarding the relative neutrality of judges and officers is all the
more curious when viewed in light of Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), wherein
the Court considered the impartiality of magistrates and police in its support of the Fourth
Amendment warrant preference:
The point of the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that it denies law enforcement
the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id. at 13. One factor distinguishing Connally from the other seizure cases was Connally’s
direct connection between case outcome and compensation. Although Connally’s justice of
the peace took his position primarily because he was “interested in a livelihood,” he received no salary; and instead he was compensated directly by “how many warrants he issued.” Connally, 429 U.S. at 246. The Court, however, has previously failed to rely on the
direct versus indirect distinction. The Court has found a “direct, personal, pecuniary inte rest” in the outcome of litigation in circumstances where any gain was channeled to the
community rather than to the individual magistrate. Id. at 249. Indeed, this phrase was
first used by a unanimous Court in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), which involved
prohibition violations being tried before a village mayor. The mayor was deemed to have a
“direct, personal, pecuniary interest” even though he was a salaried official and any fines
were divided between the state and village. Connally, 429 U.S. at 248-49. The Court applied the same analysis in Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), a case with
an even weaker link between case outcome and individual compensation. In Ward, the
mayor who sat in judgment of the defendant “had no direct personal financial stake in the
outcome of cases before him.” Connally, 429 U.S. at 249. Yet, “a major portion of the village’s income was derived from the fines, fees, and costs imposed in the mayor’s court.” Id.
Local police and federal agencies today might face similar temptations with the increased
budgetary reliance upon forfeitures.
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vided by unchecked power.239 As noted in the Federalist Papers, the
Framers divided the federal government into three branches, not out
of blind trust of officialdom, but out of suspicion of it. 240 Essentially,
the Founders, in their pragmatism, knew that best way to check one
official’s accumulation of power was to have others in government
jealously guard their own power. 241 Instead of ignoring human frailties of character, the Framers employed them to limit the dangers of
power.
In contrast to the sophisticated awareness of human nature demonstrated by our Founders, the Court in White seemed strangely naive. Justice Thomas was all too solicitous of state legislatures and local police. Now, state governments can amend the automobile exception’s boundaries by statute; legislators are able to extend government seizure power merely by expanding their definition of what
constitutes “contraband.” Meanwhile, police on the beat are empowered to make an on-the-scene determination as to what objects fall
under the “contraband” label. Further, they may then act on their
independent categorizations by seizing items that may end up filling
department coffers. All of these actions, whether by the legislative or
executive branches, can occur without bothering to seek approval
from a single judge. One wonders whether the Framers, who Justice
Thomas yearns to understand, would even recognize the debris remaining after White as the Fourth Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
When Georges Seurat painted Sunday on the Island of La Grande
Jatte, he undertook a “difficult . . . disciplined and painstaking”

239. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320 (James Madison, et al.) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
240. Federalist No. 51 provided in part:
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in
the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all
other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be
made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with
the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature
that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But
what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on
the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience
has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
Id.
241. See id.
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task. 242 His meticulous system relied upon the viewer to stand back
from his work “at the proper distance” so as to allow the minute spots
of paint to combine into a sensible whole. 243 Likewise, when the
Founders crafted the Fourth Amendment, they created an allencompassing rule based upon a careful balancing of the variety of
competing interests involved.244 The Framers meant for their audience to consider the Amendment as a whole, and not pick it apart
piecemeal by obsessing on narrow labels such as “contraband” and
“automobile exception.”
For all the effort Seurat put into his art, he could not ensure that
his work would be viewed properly. White demonstrated that the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment suffer a similar limitation. For
all their careful balancing, the Founders could not prevent the current Court from choosing to favor one part of the Fourth Amendment
litigation at the expense of the others. White’s failure to see the entire portrait of the Fourth Amendment has the potential to enable
the automobile exception to swallow the warrant preference.
Therefore, followers of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should
be alert to potential developments. Despite its own protestations to
the contrary, the Court seems ready to abandon fundamentals established by the Founders. Moreover, the current members of the Court
seem increasingly reliant upon label-logic. Also, the justices appear
to be ever more willing to undermine the Court’s own warrant preference with ever-larger exceptions. Finally, the attentive observer
might be alert to still one more observation: If the justices are seen to
be on their way to the National Gallery of Art, look for Justice Thomas to be headed for the Seurat exhibit with a magnifying glass.

242. G ARDENER HELEN, G ARDNER’S ART THROUGH THE AGES , II RENAISSANCE AND
MODERN ART 782 (7th ed. 1980).
243. The National Gallery of Art, supra note 1, at 1.
244. Justice Blackmun spoke of this balancing process in considering the warrant
preference. He observed, “[T]he Framers of the Amendment balanced the interests
involved and decided that a [search] is reasonable only if supported by a judicial warrant
based on probable cause.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (quoting U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722 (1983).

